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The interdependencies inherent in the structure of international fmandal flows and
international economic activity motivated some of the earliest attempts to develop
the basic principles of economics. The theorizing predated A. Smith by decades
and has been the subject of almost constant evolution during the intervening
centuries. The principles of economic behavior that were isolated by what are now
recognized as partial equilibrium theories have been integrated over the years to
construct the general competitive model. The overriding power of this model to
provide consistency in sets of ideas and theories cannot be denied and, as such, it
stands as a remarkable intellectual achievement. However, the accuracy of the
model might be challenged in special applications, and the specific quantitative
predictions of the model might not be testable in the complicated setting of the
naturally occurring world.
IThe authors wish 10 acknowledge the financial support of The National Science Foundation and the
Caltech Labonllory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. The cooperation of The Center
for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making at the University of Amsterdam
was important for the conduct of experiments in Amsterdam. We also wish to thank Professor Mark
Olson for his assistance with the Amsterdam experiments. The help of Hsing-Yang Lee with the
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The purpose of the experiments reported below is to explore and measure the
accuracy of the basic principles of international finance as captured by the general
competitive model. The model is applied to a set of simple laboratory economies
that contain some of the complexities about which decades, if not centuries of
theorizing, have grappled.
In a sense, the experiments are a test of "proof of principle." Since the world
economy is too complicated to permit a clear test of ideas, we do not really know
if the interrelationships of imports, exports, and exchange rates, are governed by
the operation of the most basic principles implicit in the competitive model. If the
general model fails to predict the essence of what is seen in the simple laboratory
economies, then one would certainly be suspicious of scholars and practitioners
who would claim that the model could be used to predict something that is vastly
more complex. Of course, the fact that the model might predict accurately in the
laboratory does not mean that it can be applied immediately and confidently to any
set of economies that the natural evolution of economies and politics might
produce. The basic principles of the model might be operative but they might well
be modified by other principles, in addition to those of the competitive model.
Principles that might govern the dynamics of a convergence process might be an
example. Furthermore, a knowledge of the parameters existing in the field
economies might not ever be provided to researchers in sufficient detail and
accuracy to permit accurate predictions, even if the theory is right in principle.
Thus, the exercise reported here is devoted to an examination of relatively simple
processes that have the essence of international finance. The questions posed are
relative to the simple processes that we created for the purpose of the study and we
make no particular claims about how the results here can be carried over to field
applications. It might be said, however, that by experimental standards the
economies that are studied are extremely complex. We doubt, seriously, that any
body of theory from any other branch of science could presume to predict what
might happen.
2
2. THE LABORATORY ECONOMIES
The experimental setup is consistent with requiring a type of cash-in-advance
constraint, similar to that imposed by Lucas (1982). The parameters are set so that
gains from exchange exist from purchasing in a foreign country. That is in the
competitive equilibrium, foreign trade exists. However, the experimental
environment requires that importers purchase foreign exchange in advance of their
foreign goods purchase. Agents are also unable to sell goods in aJoreign country
in order to acquire foreign exchange. Therefore, agents must acquire foreign
exchange in advance of their purchases of foreign goods.
Two countries were indexed A and B. Each country produced two goods that
were called x and y. Each country had 3 buyers of x and y who were indifferent
between the source of supply. That is, a consumer in A received the same utility
from x supplied in A, or x supplied in B, and similarly with y. Consequently, it
will make sense to talk about a demand and supply of x at either the country level
or at the world level. In addition, each country had three suppliers, each of whom
supplied both x and y.
Buyers in each country had utility functions of the form U.S. dollars = [a(Me- Me
+ R(x,y))], where a is a scale factor, Me is the currency of the country in which
the agent resides, Me is the initial endowment of the home currency, and x and y
are the consumption by the individual, measured in the units of the two
commodities, and R is in terms of home currency. Similarly, suppliers in a given
country have an incentive function of the form U.S. dollars = [b( Me- Me - Cx(x) -
Cy(y))]. Notice that individuals place no value on the currency of the country in
which they do not reside. So, this world has two countries with six agents in each.
two commodities, and two currencies which have a value only to the agents of the
home country.
Preferences are induced such that the aggregate demand and supplies are
approximated by the equations that follow:
Country A
x demand: 43 - .75x - pAx =0
y demand: 65 - 3y - pAy = 0
x supply: 2 + 2x - pAx = 0
y supply: 11 + 1.5y - pAy = 0
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Country B
x demand: 925 - 45 x - pBx = 0
y demand: 2646 - 36y - pBy =0
x supply: 127.5 + 15x - pBx = 0
y supply: 150 + 180 y - pBy = 0
The notation vik means the price of commodity k that exists in country i. These
functions are shown in Figure 1.
Constraints on trade were imposed to force the use of the international financial
markets. First, all purchases and sales in a country had to be in terms of the home
currency. It was not possible to buy in a foreign country without having foreign
currency frrst. Second, no agent was allowed to export but all agents could
import. This meant that an agent that wanted to buy foreign could not sell foreign
in order to get the exchange. The agent was required to go to the exchange market
and purchase foreign currency with the home currency. Once purchases were
made abroad, they could be imported without cost and either consumed or resold
for home currency.
3. EXPERlMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Four experiments were conducted. The subjects were students at the California
Institute of Technology and the University of Amsterdam. Three sessions took
place at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science at
Caltech, in California, and one took place at the Center for Research in
Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making (CREED), at the
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. A list of the experiments
indexed by the date of the experiment can be found in Table I.
The experiments were conducted in English and the subjects were paid in U.S.
dollars at Caltech and in Dutch guilders at Amsterdam. All of the Amsterdam
subjects had participated in one pilot experiment of this series previously. This
was intended to acquaint them with the accounting procedures, the computer keys,
and the general setting in which the economic activity takes place in an
experiment. The Caltech subjects had not participated in international finance
experiments previously, but a substantial fraction of the Caltech subjects had been
in other market experiments before.
4
h c
At the beginning of each experimental session subjects went through an interactive
computerized instructional program which took about 30 minutes. This program
gave them instructions about the keys and the other functions of the computer. 2
The experimenter read the instructions aloud, as the subjects followed along,
reading from their own copy. The instructions are contained in Appendix A.
Subjects were shown at the board an example of how to read a redemption value
sheet and a cost schedule. They were also instructed on how to calculate their
profits, which they were required to do on their end of period summary sheets.
Examples of all of the written materials used can also be found in Appendix A.
After the instruction was completed, the market was replicated 11 times, each
replication constituting a period. Each was like a trading day and each day was
identical. The first period was for practice and did not count toward subjects' cash
earnings. Each individual kept the same "utility function" in each replication,
although individuals' utility functions differed among agents. Thus, the market
environment was kept constant over the 10 periods following the practice periods.
All inventories of goods and currencies were reset at the same starting level each 2
period. Nothing was carried over from period to period, except the earnings of the
subjects.
In each of the experiments there were 12 subjects, 6 buyers and 6 sellers. There
were 3 buyers and 3 sellers in each country. As a resident of a country, each agent
was endowed with an inventory of his home currency, and only the home currency
had value to him/her. Consumption and home currency cash had value in U.S.
dollars, or Dutch guilders, depending upon the location of the experiment. Thus,
subjects had placed no value on foreign currency, except as a means to the end of
buying the goods abroad which could then be consumed or sold for home
currency.
The market mechanism employed was a modified version of the computerized
Multiple Unit Double Auction. The program was modified to allow for multiple
countries, represented by different pages on the computer screen. Each page
(country) contained three markets in which all trades took place in terms of the
2This program is part of the general MUDA program outlined in Plott (1991) and is contained in the
diskette which accompanies the general market program used in the experiment.
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home currency. The page also listed that country's cash that the subject had on
hand, which could be used to buy in the market in that country. Sales in that
country added to that country's cash that the subject had on hand. The three
markets allowed trading of x, y, and the currency of the other country. So
purchases and sales in these markets, as well as the purchase and sale of the
currency of the other country, were made in terms of the currency relevant to the
page and all bids and asks were quoted in terms of the currency of that page.
When the subject changed pages to the other country, the cash on hand of the fust
became the inventory of currency on the second page, and the inventory of foreign
currency on the first page became the cash on hand on the second page. This
convention automaticall~ enforced the requirement that all transactions in a
country took place in terms of the currency of that country.
Any agent could import from another country but no individual could export
directly. The MUDA program allows for transformations of inventory in one
group of markets (one country) to another group of markets (another country).
This feature was used to implement imports. Purchases in a foreign country, made
with the currency from that country, were automatically credited to the inventory
of the commodity held by the subject in the foreign country. The inventory of that
commodity could be costlessly transformed into the inventory of the same
commodity in the subject's home country. Once in the home country, the
commodity could be sold at home for cash or consumed. Thus, imports were
allowed but exports were not allowed. That is, no individual could transform
inventories held at home to the inventory of the same commodity held in the
foreign country. This restriction was needed to force the use of the currency
markets. If both imports and exports had been allowed, the subject could have
exported a commodity and sold it for foreign currency, which could have then
been used to purchase commodities for import and sale at home without ever using
the foreign currency markets. Since the operation of the currency market was
considered to be a fundamental purpose of the experiment, steps were taken to
make sure that such markets had a function and would thus be used.
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4. MODELS
Two models are considered, competition and autarky. In the competitive model,
agents make trades of commodities and corresponding purchases and sales of
foreign exchange to permit these trades. There is no role for money, foreign or
domestic, other than this transactions demand. Since the experimental agents
receive payoffs for domestic (but not foreign) currency held at the end of each
period, this is an economy in which demanders and suppliers have (domestic)
money in their utility functions. In other words, the domestic money has
commodity value but not to foreigners.
The competitive outcome can be found by solving equations 1-7. There is also a
possibility that autarky will occur. That is, traders will choose not to engage in
foreign trade. This is not an unreasonable notion, as one might believe at first
glance, considering the risk of the foreign exchange market and the complexity of
international transactions.
THE COMPETITIVE MODEL
The competitive model has three components. Home market demand and supply
give four equations which require material balance and that incentives to buy and
sell be equated at existing prices. The second set of equations, which we call
purchasing power parity, can be viewed as common arbitrage conditions. They
require that prices in the two countries, adjusted for exchange rates, be the same.
The final component requires equilibrium in the foreign exchange market, given
the special definitions of market demand and market supply based on imports and
exports. Of course, these three components can be viewed as partial equilibrium
models independently of any general equilibrium implications.
home market demand and supply
The law of supply and demand in the home markets captures the idea that home
prices are detennined by local demand, plus exports in relation to local supply,
plus imports. In essence, the principles of demand and supply operate
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independently of the ultimate destination or use of the commodities. The theory is
captured by the following equations.
purchasing power parity
In contrast to the home market demand and supply, the purchasing power parity
theory generalizes th~ idea of market clearing to extend across international
boundaries. In the absence of tariffs, taxes, transportation costs, and other
complicating factors, the theory asserts that the prices of the goods will be the
same in all countries after prices are factored by the exchange rates. It is the
purchasing power parity theory which can be interpreted as governing the flow of
imports and exports in response to relative prices and the exchange rate.
Let r be the exchange rate, that is, the price of currency A in terms of currency B.
The equations for the purchasing power parity theory are:
flow of funds theory
It is the flow of funds theory that provides the fmal equation for exchange rate
determination. Briefly, the theory is another way of saying that the exchange rate
is detennined by the demand and supply of a currency. Formally the equation is:
(7) (Demand for imports of x in A) pBx = r (Demand for imports of y in B) pAy.
The left hand side of the equation is the international demand for currency B that
results from the country A purchases of x from country B. Country A needs this
amount of the currency in order to make the purchases. The right hand side of the
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equation is the supply of currency B in the international market. The imports of y
by country B, when multiplied by country A price of y, yields the total amount of
country A currency that is needed by country B in order to purchase the imports.
When multiplied by the exchange rate (the units of currency B needed to purchase
a unit of currency A), the quantity on the right hand side of the equation becomes
the international supply of currency B.
Care must be exercised in interpreting these last equations. First, prices have an
inverse measurement. Suppose the demand for currency B is greater than the
supply. The price of currency B should go up, at least according to the law of
supply and demand. But, that is a decrease in the exchange rate r because r is
measured in units of B per unit of A, so an increase in the price of B is a decrease
in r. Secondly, unless operational definitions are selected carefully, equation (7)
can acquire the properties of a tautology. In particular, if "actual imports" are
substituted for the "demand for imports," and if all international exchange is spent
on foreign goods (no unused exchange and no currency speculation), and if r is
defined as an appropriate weighted average of transactions, then the equation must
be satisfied by virtue of the definitions. In the analysis that follows, actual imports
are used in the statistical analysis so the degree to which the equation is not
satisfied reflects the existence of speculation, wasted exchange and the lack of
appropriate weighting of individual transactions in the determination of the
measure of r.
AUTARKY MODEL
The autarky model is one alternative to the competitive model. It predicts that
international trade will not take place and, instead, the economies will operate as if
they were in isolation. In many respects, the model should be taken seriously and
not only as a benchmark. If the currency markets suffer from continuous
disequilibrium, if the dynamics of adjustment are such that international trade is
hazardous, or if the transactions are too slow/fast, then trade might not take place.
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5. PREDICTIONS
The models predict the exact value of each of the variables in the system. That is,
the models predict the prices in all countries and all commodities, the exchange
rate, the magnitude of imports and exports, etc. These predictions are summarized
in Table 2.
The prediction of the competitive model is the solution to equations (I).through
(7). The prediction of the autarky model is the solution of equations (I) through
(4) with the value of all imports and exports constrained to be zero. The table
displays the solutions t,o the equations rounded to the nearest ~teger. The exact
demand and supply functions used in the experiment were discrete step functions
that are approximated by the continuous functions used here. They are contained
in Appendix B..
6. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
The application of statistical models to experimental market data is characterized
by some classic problems. This section will facilitate an understanding of what
we did and the possible limitations imposed by our methodology. Two problems
appear to be without any good solution, given the current state of theory and
techniques, so all conclusions must be evaluated in light of the tentative
assumptions that are explicit and implicit in the statistical models. The first
problem is that the models, like the competitive model, make predictions of the
magnitudes of a large number of variables. From an intuitive point of view it is
not surprising if the model fails on one or even several dimensions, but the
statistical model that we have available is not forgiving of errors of any type. The
second problem occurs because the economic model is a static equilibrium model,
while the data are clearly generated by a dynamic process. Funhermore, in
simpler experiments the existence of a convergence phenomenon has been
demonstrated on many occasions. Thus, any statistical model must be sufficiently
forgiving of the lack of theory to allow some latitude for convergence.
The fIrst problem is not addressed. Instead, each of the major predictions of a
model is considered separately. Each variable is observed separately and the
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question is.posed about its magnitude in relation to the predictions of one or the
other of the models.
The second problem is addressed by the application of a simple dynamic model.
This model assumes that for any particular dependent variable, each experiment
may start from a different origin but that all markets will experience adjustment.
as described by a common functional form. Furthennore, the model assumes that
the variable will converge to a common asymptote. Fonnally, the model is a£
follows:
(8) Zit = BII DI (l/t) +...+ BIK DK (l/t) + B2 ((t-1)/t) + u
where i is the index of the experiment. Dj are dummy variables that take value 1
if i = j and value 0 otherwise. t is time measured in terms of experimental period
number. K is the number of experiments. u is a random variable distributed
normally with 0 mean.
Notice that the statistical model has some useful properties. It allows for the
possibility that variables may take different values at the start of different
experiments. The terms B Ii measure these different origins of the data for the
different experiments. The model then captures the specification that the
experiments are converging to a common asymptote. During the early periods the
asymptote gets no weight because the term (t-1)/t is small but as t gets large the
term goes to I while I/t goes to O. Thus, the weight of the end of the period data
are on the common term B2.
Thus the model can be used to test the hypothesis that the data are converging to
the predictions of various models by testing whether or not the estimates of B2 are
near the predictions of the model. In addition, a notion of weak convergence can
be used to assess the models. Comparison of the Blj terms with the B2 term
reveals the direction of convergence. If the B2 term is closer to the model's




Figures 2, 3 and 4 contain time series for experiment 042193. On the vertical axes
are measured the prices in terms of the currency in which transactions took place.
On the horizontal axes is measured the time in seconds when actions took place.
Vertical lines indicate the start and end of periods. Each country had two
commodity markets. These are combined as time series on a single figure. The
data from country A are in Figure 2 and the data from country B are in Figure 3.
One horizontal line represents the value of the competitive equilibrium for the
appropriate variable and another indicates the prediction of the autarky model.
Both lines are labeled accordingly. Figure 4 contains the time series for the
exchange rate. The scale of prices in country B is so large that the exchange rate
time series gets lost .
Estimates of the parameters of the statistical model are contained in Table 3. The
standard errors are in parentheses. Each variable is estimated separately. In
addition, separate tests are developed from the equations that define purchasing
power parity theory and flow of funds theory. These tests are also contained in the
table. The standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White's
covariance matrix estimator.
The analysis begins with the most central variables, the exchange rate and the
volume of exchange. If the response of these variables to the underlying
economic conditions is not as predicted by theory, then the magnitudes of all
other variables would be affected relative to theory. The frrst result is that the
exchange rates are at a level anticipated by the competitive model. The second
result is that the volume of exchange falls short of the competitive quantity.
RESULT 1. Exchange rates converge to the competitive prediction.
SUPPORT. The competitive equilibrium exchange rate is 47. The estimate of B2
for the exchange rate variable is 47.127 with a standard error of 1.34. The
hypothesis that the exchange rates are converging to the predictions of the
competitive equilibrium model cannot be rejected.•
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RESULT 2. The volume of exchange in the international market falls short of the
competitive equilibrium volume. In only two of the experiments is the volume
weakly converging to the competitive equilibrium. The autarky model can be
rejected.
SUPPORT. The estimates from the model are in Table 3 listed as the variable
<V cur>. The estimated asymptote of the volume is 386 compared with the
competitive equilibrium volume which should be at least 480. It could be more
than 480 without being inconsistent with the model because of the possible
existence of speculation. The hypothesis that the actual equals the theoretical can
be rejected. In addition the B lj terms for the first two experiments are closer to
the competitive equilibrium than the asymptote. so weak convergence in these two
cases is questionable.•
Result two serves as a signal that these systems are not exactly on track as
described by the competitive equilibrium model. Since the volume is not accurate
the simultaneous nature of the model's equation system suggests that inaccuracies
are likely to exist elsewhere. The following results constitute an attempt to isolate
the errors and an attempt to find the fundamental causes. The prices that exist in
each country are the obvious places to begin. That beginning is addressed by the
following result.
RESULT 3. Prices in countries do not converge to the competitive equilibria in the
strong sense but they converge in the weak sense. In all cases prices are closer to
the competitive equilibrium than to autarky.
SUPPORT. The table contains the estimates of the BIj term for two countries,
two commodities and four experiments. It contains the estimate of the B2 terms
for each of the four prices (two countties, two commodities). All are statistically
different from the predictions of the competitive model. All are closer to the
predictions of the competitive model than to the predictions of the autarky model.
In all but four cases (three instances for pAy and one instance of pRy) of the
sixteen possibilities, the data are further from the competitive equilibrium at the
start of the experiment than at the end.•
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It is intere~ting to note that while the absolute prices are not on the competitive
equilibrium, the movements are in that direction. The next result asks if the price
ratios in a country are as predicted by the model. Are the relative scarcities in a
country being reflected by prices even though the absolute levels of prices are off?
The answer, provided by the result. is that the price ratios in both countries are not
at the competitive levels but the movement is in that direction.
RESULT 4. Relative prices of x and yare converging in the weak sense toward
the competitive equilibrium prediction in both countries. The competitive
equilibrium is a better predictor than is autarky.
SUPPORT. The table contains the test. As can be seen, the hypothesis that B2 is
the ratio that is predicted by the competitive equilibrium can be rejected in both
cases (two countries and two price ratios). The ratios seem close to 0.7 and 0.3 as
compared to the equilibrium condition of 0.4 and the differences are statistically
significant. The weak convergence is clearly present since, in all but one of the
eight possible cases, the data at the beginning of the experiment are further from
the competitive equilibrium than are the pooled data at the end. In both cases the
B2 estimate is closer to the competitive equilibrium than it is to the autarky
predictions.
The previous result examined the data from the point of view of relative prices
within a country. The next result views the data from the perspective of relative
prices across countries and factors in the exchange rate. It indicates that the nature
of the responses of the variables to the underlying economic conditions might
differ according to the commodity.
RESULT 5. Purchasing power parity, as defined by equations (5) and (6),
receives some support in one of the markets (the y) but is rejected in the other (the
x). Weak convergence is not present in the x market. but is present in the y
market.
SUPPORT. The test statistics are in the table. The hypothesis that the equation is
satisfied in the y market can be rejected at the .05 level which, in this context, is
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-interpreted as borderline. The coefficient is 1.1, as opposed to the 1.0 predicted by
the competitive model. Weak convergence is also present in every experiment. In
the x market the coefficient is 0.5 as opposed to 1. This means that the values are
off by about 50%. In the x market only one of the experiments is closer at the end
than it was at the beginning; but, in three of the four cases, the BIj'S are not
significantly different from the point estimate of B2.•
The- previous two results suggest that inaccuracies of the competitive model reside
in both intercountry comparisons and intracountry comparisons. The next result is
an attempt to focus more clearly on the behavior of the localities where the price
formation process takes place. Equations (I) through (4) are local market demand
and supply equations. These say that, in each country and for each commodity,
the local prices are set by the local conditions of demand and supply, together with
the imports and exports. They are statements about the reaction of domestic
economies to the underlying economic forces. The question posed is whether or
not excess demand, as defined by the actual parameters of the experiment and by
the observed prices, exists in the local economies. Have the prices adjusted in the
domestic economies, or are they adjusting to satisfy the partial equilibrium
conditions that demand equals supply? The result suggest that the two countries
are adjusting much differently.
RESULT 6. The hypothesis that domestic excess demand is converging to zero
can be rejected in country A for good x. Domestic excess demand is converging
to zero in country B, for both goods, and for y in country A in the weak sense.
SUPPORT. Excess demand is defined by actual experimental parameters. Prices
are average prices in a period. The estimated coefficients in Table 3 provide the
support. In country A there is an excess supply of x at the asymptote of the
adjustment path of 9.6 units. This is significantly different from zero.
Furthermore, the asymptote is further from the equilibrium than the starting point
in three of the four experiments. Similarly there is a significant excess demand
(3.6 units) for y in country A. However, the quantity is small and this market is
converging in the weak sense to an excess demand of zero in three of the four
experiments, and the fourth experiment show no statistically significant
movement. In country B the x market provides weak support for the hypothesis of
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zero excess demand and the excess demand is converging to zero in the weak
sense in three of the four possible cases. In country B the excess demand for y is
converging to zero.-
The above result indicates that the law of supply and demand is operating at the
local levels but an inexplicable asymmetry exists between the countries. The
question to pose is whether there might exist a deeper problem due to the way that
the law is fonnulated at the international level to determine the exchange rate.
The next result is fundamental. It says that the flow of funds theory is operating to
determine the rate of exchange.
Figure 5 contains a time series of the demand and supply of international
exchange, as predicted by the flow of funds model. The demand for foreign
exchange by country A, is defined to be the country's actual imports from country
B, times the price of the good in country B. The supply of foreign exchange is the
actual imports of country B, times the country A price of the good that B is
importing, times the exchange rate. The two time series are labeled and graphed
for each of the four experiments. The visual impression is that the quantity of
exchange demanded is converging to the quantity of exchange supplied. The next
result makes that visual impression precise.
RESULT 7. Flow of funds theory as represented by equation (7) where the
demand for imports is represented by actual imports, is supported in the data.
SUPPORT. The variable (IMPAx)( pBx) - (r) (IMPBy) (pAy) was measured
with the standard model. The estimates in Table 3 show that the time series is
converging to 0 which is the prediction of the competitive model. The B2 term is
measured to be 1251 which is not significantly different from 0.-
The above results suggest that the patterns of international finance are similar but
not exactly as predicted by the competitive model. For the most part the financial
variables are moving in directions that would be suggested by the competitive
equilibrium model. Either wasted exchange or speculation occurs at frrst, but
decreases over time. The next series of questions inquires about the real sectors of
the economies and the underlying trade. Since the fmancial variables are moving
in ways that the competitive model anticipates, it might be expected that the real
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sectors areresponding accordingly also. The next result says that the patterns of
specialization are consistent with competitive theory.
RESULT 8. International trade patterns are consistent with the principle of
comparative advantage.
SUPPORT. The competitive model predicts that country A will import x and
country B will import y. As shown in the table, net imports of x by country A are
24.5 units and net imports of y by country B are 8.8 units. These levels are short
of the quantitative predictions of the competitive model of 32 units and 12 units
respectively, however, ,in all but one of the eight possible cases, the direction of
movement is toward the competitive equilibrium quantities..These patterns are
sufficient to support the result.e
Since trade is developing along the lines of comparative advantage and since the
financial sectors are not far out of line, both consumption and production patterns
should be conforming to the model. Since such conformity need not be the case,
except as dictated by the principles of economics, which are under investigation, it
is necessary to check. The next two results indicate that both are moving in the
directions anticipated.
RESULT 9. Consumption patterns are moving toward the predictions of the
competitive model.
SUPPORT. Two countries and two commodities represent four variables to
consider. All four of these variables are significantly different from the
competitive equilibrium as measured by the B2 term. But, in a sense, are very
close. For example, there are 8.69 units of consumption of y in country A (the
competitive equilibrium is 8 units) and 6.04 units of consumption of x in country
B (the competitive equilibrium is 5 units). However, the variables are weakly
converging in all but two of the sixteen possible cases (as measured by the Blj
estimates as opposed to the B2 estimates).e
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RESULT 10. Production patterns are moving toward the predictions of the
competitive equilibrium model.
SUPPORT. In four of the 16 cases (4 variables and 4 experiments) the production
levels are weakly converging to the competitive equilibrium.e
8. CONCLUSIONS
The autarky model can be solidly rejected by these experiments. It is not the case
that the hazards of the foreign exchange markets as such that international trade
stops or takes place at very low levels only. On the other hand, the competitive
model is not perfect. Although, in most instances, the outcome variables are
converging to the competitive prediction in the weak sense, the model fails to
predict the exact levels of activity in many instances, even when the asymptotic
tendencies are incorporated. Hazards of trade do exist and can appear in the fonn
of "wasted" exchange. However, the equilibrating tendencies of the system serve
to reduce the uncertainty and facilitate trade.
Generally speaking, the exchange rate seeks a level that is near that predicted by
the competitive model. It converges from below and seems to be driven by the
flow of funds model of exchange rate determination. However, that creates
somewhat of a paradox. International trade is below competitive levels. This
relatively low level of international trade may be associated with the relative
prices lying between the competitive and autarky predictions in both countries.
Country A seems to be more problematic with the price of x persistently much
higher than the competitive equilibrium level. The price of x in A explains the
strong rejection of purchasing power parity for x.
In general, prices within countries do not seem to be adjusting rapidly to local
demand and supply conditions, although there is evidence of slow convergence to
local market clearing. The adjustment is not taking place at all for market x in
countryA.
Despite the behavior of local and international price ratios, the real sectors of the
economies are moving in the directions of the competitive equilibrium. Patterns
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of international trade are consistent with the law of comparative advantage. Local
production and consumption levels are converging to the competitive equilibrium
as well.
The competitive model is not perfect, in any sense. but the principles on which the
general theory is based, leads to a model that predicts the general movement of
economic activity in a very complex and interdependent setting. When people
discuss vague concepts of "economic forces," these data suggest that the
formalization of the concepts with the competitive equilibrium model can be very
useful. The forces are increasing the international trade between the two
countries, with the result that the magnitudes of most outcome variables,
especially net exports, production. consumption, and the exchange rate. move
slowly toward the competitive equilibrium.
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TABLE 1: EXPE~NTS: LOCATION, SUBJECTS, EXPERIENCE
INDEX LOCATION NUMBER EXPERIENCE NUMBER OF
OF PERIODS
SUBJECfS
011393 Calteeh 12 general 10
market
011493 Calteeh 12 general 10
market
040793 University of 12 1 pilot 10
Anlsterdam experiment
042193 Caltech 12 general 10
market
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TABLE 2: PREDICTED PRICES OF THE COMPETITNE EQUll..IBRIUM
MODEL AND THE AUTARKY MODEL: COUNTRIES A AND B;
COMMODITIES X AND Y; AND EXCHANGE RATES
OF CURRENCIES A AND B
PRICES
country country country country country country
A A A B B B
x y crA/crB x y crB/crA
Compo 15 41 1/47 682 1888 47
Eo.IAutarky 32 29 ..... 327 2230 ......
Prices in the table are the values of the solution to the continuous approximation of the
experimental parameters rounded to the nearest integer.
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATES OF STATISTICAL MODEL; COEFFICIENT
ESTIMATES (STANDARD ERRORS); HYPOTHESIS TESTS
AND GENERAL STATISTICS
Var. B11 B12 B13 B14 B2 RL DW CE Aut CE Aut
Pred. Pred. Rej. Rej.




(5.002) (6.314) (1.906) (3.304) (1.340)
pl."lpo/' 0.769 1.174 1.034 U58 0.706 .43 .87 .4 1.156 p<.OO5 p<.OO5
(0.043) (0.081) (0.089) (0.053) (0.026)
pl.8lpy8 0.230 0.482 0.279 0.312 0.330 .2S 1.83 .4 ...... p<.OO5 p<.OO5
(0.035) (0.042) (0.083) I (0.023) (0.015)I
pI.81r.pl." 0.639 1.693 0.736 0.541 0.531 .56 1.90 I
· p<.OOS
(0.087) (0.270) (O.23ll (0.076) (0.040)
py81r.py" 1.969 4.1.... 2.420 1.447 1.101 .74 2.02 I
· p<.05
(0.269) (0.525) lO.076) (0.153) (0.058)
IMP " 3.356 -25.982 14.102 2.138 24.526 .72 1.27 32 0 p<.005 p<.OO5
" (3.472) (8.606) (3.964) (3.166) (1.245)
IMP y 1.537 11.231 8.601 4.349 8.863 .14 2.24 12 0 p<.OO5 p<.OO58
(2.541) (4.199) (3.555) (1.814) (0.749)
ue 15.960 ·0.064 13.078 16.289 32.002 .71 1.20 38 14 p<.005 p<.005
(1.878) (6.069) (3.774) (1.598) (0.889)
yae 11.673 7.880 10.774 13.069 8.694 .21 2.48 8 12 p<.025 p<.OO5
(0.590) (1.594) (1.025) (0.551) (0.352)
lbe 14.809 21.825 11.881 15.368 6.042 .73 1.54 5 13 p<.OO5 p<.OO5
(1.328) (1.601) (0.734) (1.170) (0.380)
ybe 15.075 15.593 20.070 15.212 18.945 .08 I 2.17 21 12 p<.OO5 p<.OO5
(2.687) (2.898) (3.162) (1.942) (0.639)
up 12-498 24.435 9.514 14.044 7.595 .51 l.52 6 14 p<.OO5 p<.OO5
(1.871) (2.m) (1.0IB) (2.097) (0.571)
Yip 13.070 18.963 19.298 17.277 17.715 .Il 2.01 19 12 p<.01 p<.OO5
(2.151) (2.558) (2.522) (1.502) I (0.505) I
lbp 18.216 ·2.729 26.035 17.588 30.510 .57 1.17 37 13 p<.005 p<.OO5
(2.250) (8.051) (4.595) (2.361) (1.201)
ybp 13.933 4.263 11.585 11.043 9.879 .63 2.68 10 12 No p<.OO5
(0.355) (1.061) (0.382) (0.341) (0.213)
V cur 401.61 528.28 70.75 65.61 386.01 .25 2.028 0!480 0 p<.OOS p<.OOS







=x consumed in councry A.
= x produced in country A
= volume in cunency market (currency A)
=flow of funds
=imports of x into country A
The order of the variables in the table corresponds to the order of results. Variables
relevant to result 1 fIrst. etc.
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TABLE 3 (cont.): LOCAL MARKET CLEARING
CEo
Variable B11 B12 B13 B14 B2 CE= DW R2 AIL
AuLplllli. R.cjocled
DxA(pxA) _ imp/
-3.107 4.022 -18.729 -8.248 -9.646 0 1.139 0.15 p<.OO5
- SI A(p) (2.935) (4.102) (8.155) (4.906) (1.555)
DyA~) + imp,s
-10.526 2.934 4.984 -7.081 3.690 0 1.366 0.24 p<.OO5
_ S A(p) (4.692) (3.786) (4.458) (2.739) (1.017)y
D1B(px~ + imp/'
-15.242 -31.775 -3.402 -12.699 4.895 0 1.580 .m p<.05
- SIB(p) (2.972) (9.056) (18.382) (3.448) (2.767)
r>yB(py B) _ imp B
-3.523 42.373 2.872 16.468 -1.189 0 1.755 .58 noty
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Figure 3 • Country 8
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Figure 5 • Exchange Demand and Supply
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This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions
are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a
considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash.
In the experiment we are going to conduct an market in which some of you will be
buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of trading periods. Find a sheet
labelled Buyer or Seller, which describes the value to you of any decisions you might
make. You are not to reveal the information on this sheet to anyone. It is your own
private information.
In the experiment there are two goods and two locations, which you could think of
as separate countries. The goods are called X and Y and the locations are called A and
B. In location A, there is a market for X and a market for Y. Also, in location B, there
is a market for X and a market for Y. As will be explained later, the locations will be on
different screens on the computer.
Each location has its own special currency. All transactions in location A will take
place in currency A and all transactions in location B will take place in urrency B. Each
unit of currency A is worth guilders to you and each unit of currency B is worth
........... guilders to you.
2 Specific Instructions to Sellers
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers as many units of
X and Y as you might want. The first unit of X that you sell in a trading period, you
obtain at a cost of the amount listed on the sheet in row (1) in the section of the sheet
entitled Cost Schedule for X, in the column labelled unit cost. The second unit of X that
you sell during the same trading period you obtain at a cost of the amount listed in row
(2) in the column marked unit cost, etc... The profits from each sale, which are yours
to keep, are computed by taking the difference between price at which you sold the unit
and the cost of the unit. That is:
Your Earnings = Sale Price of Unit - Cost of Unit
Suppose, for example, that you sell two units of X and that the cost for the first unit
of X is 140 and for the second unit is 160. If you sell th first unit at 200 and the second
at 190, your earnings are:
Earnings from First = 200 - 140 = 60
Earnings from Second = 190 - 160 = ;30
Total Earnings = 60 + 30 = 90
The end of period summary will help you record your profits. On row A, record
the total cost of X that you sold during the period. The X which you sold during the
period is equal to your inventory of X at the beginning of the market period minus your
inventory at the end of the market period. This total can be found in the row of the
section labelled Cost Schedule for X corresponding to the amount of X you sold during
the period in the last column, which is entitled total cost. For example, if you sold two
units during the market period, the total cost can be found in row (2). Similarly, on row
B record the total cost of Y that you sold during the period.
On rows (C) and (D) record your begi.nning of period and end of period inventory of
the currency whi h has value to you. On row (E), enter an amount equal to the amount
in row (D) minu the amoun in row (C). (E) indicates your net change in cash for the
market period. On row (F) re ord your total profit for the period. The total profit equals
th total cash obtained from sales of X and Y minus the cost of the X and Y sold. It
also equals the amount in row (E) minus the amount in row (A) minus the amount in
row (B). Subsequent periods should be recorded similarily.
3 Specific Instructions to Buyers
During each market period, you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many
units of X and Y a you might want. For the first unit of X that you buy in a trading
period, you will receive the amount listed in row (1) in the section of the page entitled
redemption value schedule for X in the column marked unit value. If you buy a second
unit during the trading period, you will receive the additional amount listed in row (2) in
the column marked unit redemption value, etc... The profits from each purchase, which
are yours to ke p, are computed by taking the difference between the redemption value
and the purchase price of the unit bought. That is:
Your Earnings = Redemption Value - Purchase Price
Suppose, for exampl that you buy two units and that your redemption value for the
first unit is 200 and for the second unit i 1 O. If you pay 1.50 for the first unit and 160
for the second unit, your earnings are:
Earnings from First = 200 - 150 = 50
Earnings from Second = 180 - 160 = 20
Total Earnings = 50 + 20 = 70
The end of period summary will help you record your profits. In row (A) enter the
total value of X consumed. This amount can b found in th column labelled total value
..
-in the row corresponding to the total number of X held in your inventory at the end of
the period. Sirnilarily, record the total value of Y consumed in row (B).
On rows (C) and (D) record your beginning of period and end of period inventory of
the currency which has value to you. On line (E), enter an amount equal to the amount
in row (D) minus the amount in row (C). On line (F) record your total profit for the
period which equals your redemption values for having X and Y in your inventory at the
end of the market period, minus the cash which you spent to acquire them.
4 Currency
The locations are indicated by two computer screens. You can move from screen to screen
by using the page up and page down keys. On each screen Cash on Hand is given in
the upper right corner. On one screen, which represents location A, the Cash on Hand
indicates your inventory of currency A. On the other screen, which represents location
B, the Cash on Hand indicates your inventory of currency B.
While at location A, market 3 allows you to buy and sell currency B. Similar-ily while
at location B, market 6 allows you to buy and sell currency A.
All participants may transfer units of X and Y from one of the 10 at ions to the other.
Some participants can transfer units of X and Y from location B to location A, but not
from location A to location B. The rest of the participants can transfer units of X and
Y from location A to location B, but not from B to A. To transfer units, use the F4 key.
5 Trading Profits
A possible source of profits is from buying and selling X, 'y 1 currency A, and currency B.
Selling increases your cash on hand by the amount of the sale price. Buying reduces your
cash on hand by the amount of the purchase. Thus, you can either gain or lose money
on the purchase and resale of units.
6 Beginning of Period Inventories
All sellers begin each period with inventory of X and \". All buyers begin each period with
no X or Y. All participants begin each period with a large inventory of either currency
A or currency B. Beginning of period inventories are the same for each market period.
7 Note on the System
You can imagine yourself at one of the two locations with an inventory of that location's
currency. Should you find it advantageous, you could buy the currency of the other
3
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